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IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

NO. 47637-2019

)

V.

)

Kootenai County Case N0.

)

CR28-19-10439

)

ROBERT MICHAEL DAVIS,

)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

)
)

ISSUES
1.

2.

Has Davis failed t0 show that the district court abused its sentencing discretion
When it imposed a uniﬁed sentence of ﬁve years, with two years ﬁxed, upon his
conviction for possession of methamphetamine?
Has Davis

failed t0

his Idaho Criminal

show

that the district court

Rule 35 motion?

abused

its

discretion

when

it

denied

ARGUMENT
I.

Davis Has Failed To
A.

Show That The

District

Court Abused

Its

Sentencing Discretion

Introduction

A police ofﬁcer conducted a trafﬁc stop 0n the car Davis was driving.

(R., p.13.

1)

Davis

admitted that he was 0n probation and consented to a search of his person. (R., p.13?) The ofﬁcer
discovered a small bag in Davis’s pocket that contained methamphetamine residue.

14.)

The ofﬁcer then searched

(R.,

pp.13-

the car and discovered multiple items of paraphernalia, including a

syringe loaded with methamphetamine.

(R., p.14.)

Davis was arrested and charged With

possession of a controlled substance, possession 0f paraphernalia, and a persistent Violator

enhancement. (R, pp.53-54;

ﬂ

R., pp.70, 79; 9/3/19 Tr., p.4, L.15

— p.5,

L.9.)

Pursuant to a plea agreement, Davis pled guilty to possession a controlled substance. (R.,
p.68; 9/3/19 Tr., p.10, Ls.18-22.)

The

state

moved

t0 dismiss the charge

0f possession 0f

paraphernalia and the persistent Violator enhancement. (R., pp.70-71, 79-80; 9/3/19 TL, p.4, L.15

— p.5,

L.9.)

The

district court

imposed a uniﬁed sentence of ﬁve

pp.81-83; 11/4/19 Tr., p.27, L.1

B.

Standard

— p.29,

L.5.)

years, with

Davis timely appealed.

two years ﬁxed.

(R.

(R., pp.84-87, 97-100.)

Of Review

The length of a sentence

is

reviewed under an abuse 0f discretion standard considering the

defendant’s entire sentence. State V. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing
State V. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460, 50 P.3d 472,

159 P.3d 838 (2007)).

1

2

The

state

It is

presumed

that the

475 (2002); State

V.

Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,

ﬁxed portion 0f the sentence

Will be the defendant's

adopts the Appellant’s citation designations.

Although he did not mention

stop. (1 1/4/19 T11, p.25,

it

t0 the ofﬁcer,

L.11 — p.26,

L.4.)

Davis was also 0n parole

at the

time 0f the trafﬁc

probable term of conﬁnement. Li. (citing State

Where
is

a sentence

is

Trevino, 132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999)).

Within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that

27 (2000)).

When a trial court’s discretionary decision

reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine Whether the

lower court: (1) perceived the issue as one 0f discretion;
discretion; (3) acted consistently with

it;

it

a clear abuse of discretion. State V. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing

State V. Lundguist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d

is

V.

and

(4)

reached

its

decision

by an

(2) acted Within the

any legal standards applicable

boundaries of such

t0 the speciﬁc choices before

exercise of reason. State V. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270,

429

P.3d 149, 158 (2018) (citation omitted).

Davis Has Shown

C.

To
that,

No Abuse Of The

District Court’s Sentencing Discretion

carry the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant must establish

under any reasonable View of the

facts, the

sentence

was

excessive.

State V. Farwell, 144

Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). In determining whether the appellant met

this

the court considers the entire sentence but, because the decision t0 release the defendant

is

burden,

on parole

exclusively the province of the executive branch, presumes that the determinate portion Will be

the period ofactual incarceration. State V. Bailey, 161 Idaho 887, 895, 392 P.3d 1228, 1236 (2017)

(citing

M,

the appellant

144 Idaho

at

726, 170 P.3d at 391).

must demonstrate

that reasonable

To

establish that the sentence

was

excessive,

minds could not conclude the sentence was

appropriate t0 accomplish the sentencing goals 0f protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation,

and retribution.

Far_well,

144 Idaho

at

736, 170 P.3d at 401. “‘A sentence

is

reasonable if it appears

necessary t0 accomplish the primary objective 0f protecting society and t0 achieve any 0r

all

the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, 0r retribution.” Ba_iley, 161 Idaho at 895-96,

P.3d

at

1236-37 (quoting State

V.

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

1, 8,

368 P.3d 621, 628 (2015)).

0f

392

Here, the imposed sentence ﬁts within the statutory limits.

possession of methamphetamine

is

seven years.

The maximum penalty

Davis concedes that his

I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1).

uniﬁed ﬁve-year sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum. (Appellant’s
he “must show that the sentence, in
reasonable View of the facts.”

Davis’s sentence

is

light

of the governing

m1, 137 Idaho

at

criteria, is

460, 50 P.3d

at

L.13 — p.26, L22.)

(1

ﬂ

1/4/19 Tr., p.28, Ls.8-10;

methamphetamine, a felony.

that all

excessive under any

cannot do

detail.

so.

In imposing

(1 1/4/ 19 Tr., p.23,

Davis’s ﬁrst conviction was for misdemeanor

(PSI, p.6.)

His second conviction was for possession of

(PSI, pp.6-7; 11/4/19 T11, p.23, Ls.13-17.)

(1 1/4/19

Thus,

0f his convictions involved controlled substances.

PSI, pp.6-8.)

possession 0f a controlled substance.

He was

placed 0n

TL, p.23, Ls.18-19.) Davis violated his probation When he was

again convicted of felony possession of a controlled substance.
PSI, p.7.)

brief, p.3.)

reasonable as a matter 0f the district court’s discretion.

The court found

probation in that case.

He

475.

Davis’s sentence, the district court reviewed Davis’s criminal history in

for

The court retained jurisdiction

in his

(1 1/4/19 Tr., p.23,

second felony possession case.

Ls.20-24;

ﬂ

(1 1/4/19 Tr., p.23,

L.25 — p.24, L.2.) Davis completed a rider and was placed 0n another period 0f probation, but he

was eventually

sent to prison and then paroled. (1 1/4/19 Tr., p.23, L.22

released from prison, Davis

was convicted of felony possession of a

third time thereby Violating his parole.

again placed on probation.

(1

— p.24,

controlled substance for the

(PSI, p.7; 11/4/19 Tr., p.24, L.23

1/4/19 Tr., p.25, L.15

—

p.26, L.8.)

L.22.) After being

— p.25,

L.4.)

Davis was

While Davis was 0n parole

for

felony possession 0f a controlled substance in one case and on probation for felony possession 0f
a controlled substance in another, he

was charged With possession of methamphetamine

case. (R., pp.53-54; 11/4/19 Tr., p.25, L.23

— p.26,

L.22.)

in this

Additionally, the court explained and then applied the four goals 0f sentencing in light of

Davis’s criminal history and ongoing drug use.

acknowledged the
Tr., p.28,

(1

1/4/19 T11, p.27, Ls.1-15.)

Davis was doing

“rehabilitative things” that

t0 address his

The court

drug use.

(1 1/4/19

Ls.18-20.) However, given Davis’s failure to successfully complete several periods of

probation and parole, and considering his “chronic and ongoing” use 0f illicit substances the court

found that
rider.

it

could not justify another probation and also found n0

(11/4/19 Tr., p.28, Ls.8-17.)

utility in

placing

him 0n another

Therefore, the court determined that those rehabilitative

measures were “simply going to have t0 be done 0n parole.”

(1

1/4/19 Tr., p.28, Ls.20-21.)

Furthermore, the court found that possession 0f a controlled substance was not a Victimless
crime, but “a scourge in our

our country.”

and

(1

community” and “a severe problem in many other communities around

1/4/19 Tr., p.27, Ls.21-25.) In order t0 protect society, t0 deter and punish Davis,

t0 deter others, the court

probations, pick

up new

concluded that

it

could no allow him to “pick up

felonies, get probations.” (1 1/4/19 Tr., p.28, L.25

new

— p.29,

felonies, get

L.5.)

Because

the court expressly considered the goals 0f sentencing in light 0f Davis’s criminal history, ongoing

drug use, and the need t0 protect society, the

district court

did not abuse

imposed a uniﬁed ﬁve-year sentence, with two years ﬁxed, rather than

its

discretion

when

it

retain jurisdiction 0r place

Davis 0n probation.
Davis erroneously argues his sentence

is

excessive because “the district court failed t0

properly consider the mitigating factors that exist in his case.”

(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)

Speciﬁcally, Davis argues that the court “failed t0 give proper consideration t0 his admitted

substance abuse problem,” his “desire for treatment,” and his “expressed

committing the instant offense.” (Appellant’s

brief, pp.4-5.)

remorse for

His argument lacks merit.

The record

belies the contention that the district court did not properly consider Davis’s

After reviewing Davis’s

substance abuse problem, his desire for treatment, and his remorse.

criminal history in detail during the sentencing hearing, the court found that Davis’s relationship

with drugs was “chronic and ongoing.”

good things” and the
use after his

arrest.

(1 1/4/19 Tr., p.28, Ls.8-10.)

“rehabilitative things” that

(1 1/4/19 Tr., p.28, Ls.

1

The court applauded “the

Davis had undertaken to address his ongoing drug

However,

8-20.)

in determining the proper

amount of

mitigating weight to assign t0 Davis’s rehabilitative efforts, the court concluded that the need for

rehabilitation

L.5.)

It is

was subordinate

t0 the other goals

0f sentencing.

(1 1/4/19 Tr., p.28,

L.18 — p.29,

well-within the district court’s discretion to weigh the different obj ectives 0f sentencing

and give them differing weights.
(1998) (holding the

district court

E

State V.

did not abuse

Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185
its

discretion in concluding that the objectives 0f

punishment, deterrence, and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). Thus,
the court acted well within

t0

its

discretion

when it concluded that the protection of society,

the need

punish and deter Davis, and the need t0 deter others took priority over Davis’s rehabilitation.

Davis also argues that the court failed to properly consider the fact that he had a “job
waiting for

Davis’s

him upon

trial

release.” (Appellant’s brief, p.5.)

counsel did not present any information about potential employment opportunities as

mitigating evidence. (9/3/ 1 9 Tr., p.2 1 L.1
,

to

However, during the sentencing hearing

— p.23, L.1 1.) Furthermore, When given the opportunity

speak in mitigation ofpunishment, Davis declined. (9/3/ 19

Tr., p.

1 8,

Ls.9- 14.) Notwithstanding

the fact that neither Davis nor his counsel presented information about his potential

opportunities if he were released 0n

the PSI,

community

supervision, such information

which the court plainly considered. (9/3/19

20; p.18, L.23

— p.19,

Tr., p.13, Ls.1-16;

L.19; p.21, Ls.2-15; p.23, Ls.12-17.)

employment

was contained

in

11/4/19 Tr., p.17, Ls.15-

In sum, the district court acted reasonably and well within

its

discretion

when

it

imposed a

uniﬁed sentence of ﬁve years With two years ﬁxed.

II.

Show That The

Davis Has Failed

A.

Court Abused
Rule 35 Motion

District

Its

Discretion

When It Denied His

Introduction

Davis ﬁled a Rule 35 motion t0 reduce his sentence.

on his motion, Davis testiﬁed
and

that

that

(R., pp.94-96.)

During the hearing

he had completed a “[ﬂaith-based one-step recovery program,”

he intended to complete a sixteen month, 24/7 program, which he had been participating

in prior t0 being sentenced. (2/21/2020 Tr., p.6,

retained jurisdiction.

his sentence

(R., p.95.)

from two years

L.24 — p.9, L6.) Davis requested a period 0f

Alternatively, he request the court increase the

t0 three

ﬁxed portion of

and a half years and decrease the indeterminate period of

incarceration from three years t0 zero. (R., p.95; 2/21/2020 Tr., p.9, Ls.7-13; p.13, Ls.1-3.)

district court

denied his motion.

(2/21/2020

Tr., p.14,

L.4

—

The

p.15, L.18; Augmentation: Order

Denying Defendant’s Rule 35 Motion.)

Standard

B.

Of Review

“If a sentence

35

is

is

Within the statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule

a plea for leniency, and

Huffman, 144 Idaho
P.3d 381, 385

(Ct.

at

we review

the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion.”

203, 159 P.3d at 840; see also State V. Anderson, 163 Idaho 513, 517, 415

App. 2015) (“A motion

for reduction

0f sentence under I.C.R. 35

a plea for leniency, addressed t0 the sound discretion 0f the court”).

is

essentially

In conducting a review of

the denial of a Rule 35 motion, the Court considers the entire record and applies the

same

criteria

used for determining the reasonableness 0f the original sentence. Anderson, 163 Idaho
P.3d

C.

at

at

517, 415

385.

The

District

Court Did Not Abuse

Davis has failed t0 show that the

Rule 35 motion.

To

prevail

Its

Discretion

district court

When It Denied Davis’s

abused

0n appeal, Davis “must show

its

V.

district court in

support of the Rule

Brunet, 155 Idaho 724, 729, 316 P.3d 640, 645 (2013) (internal quotations

omitted). Davis claims he presented

hearing.

When it denied Davis’s

that the sentence is excessive in light

0f new 0r additional information subsequently provided t0 the
35 motion.” State

discretion

Rule 35 Motion

(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)

new

information in the form 0f his testimony at the Rule 35

Davis’s intention t0 continue treatment following his term of

imprisonment was not new information because his

counsel informed the court during the

trial

sentencing hearing that he was in “the 24/7 program,” that he was “doing well,” and that he

had about fourteen months of programming

to complete.

(1

1/4/19 T11, p.21, L.23

—

p.22,

still

L3.)

Cognizant of the fact that Davis desired to continue treatment, the court stated that he could
continue his rehabilitation “0n parole.”

Even

if

(1 1/4/19 Tr., p.28,

Ls.18-21.)

new, the evidence shows no abuse 0f discretion.

In denying Davis’s Rule 35

motion, the court maintained that imposition of the original sentence was the best
the four goals of sentencing.

(2/21/2020

Tr., p.14,

granting Davis’s request for a reduced sentence

L.4

—

p.15, L.12.)

way t0

achieve

The court determined

would not meet the goals 0f sentencing,

that

especially

protecting society and rehabilitation. (2/21/20 TL, p.15, Ls.3-16.) Given Davis’s history 0f failed

probations and his demonstrated inability to maintain sobriety while on
his completion

community

supervision,

0f the one-step recovery program While in custody only reinforced the

court’s rationale. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse

35 request for probation.

its

discretion

district

by denying her Rule

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court to afﬁrm the judgment ofconviction and the order

denying Davis’s Rule 35 motion.

DATED this 4th day of August, 2020.

/s/

Justin R. Porter

JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General
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I
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I
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BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means 0f iCourt
this 4th

ELIZABETH A. ALLRED
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documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/

Justin R. Porter
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